Case Study: MONTGOMERY COUNTY COURTHOUSE

UNIT VII

MONTGOMERY COUNTY COURTHOUSE CASE STUDY

BCJ 3450

Columbia Southern University

In Court Security; A Guide for Post 911 Environments by Tony L. Jones, there are three basic elements of physical security: monitoring and controlling the access of people and vehicles; the detection & prevention of unauthorized intrusions; and the safeguarding & hardening of buildings, people, and assets (Jones, 2003). Courthouses in the United States are beacons of our democracy; highlighting freedom, liberty, and fairness. Our nation’s courthouses are prime targets of not only terrorist whose anti-American viewpoints have proven deadly year after year, but also to some seemingly average citizens upset with the outcome of their cases or pent on violence aimed at somebody within the walls of our courtrooms.

The Montgomery County Courthouse scenario depicted many missed opportunities, errors in judgement & common sense, and provide the ability to run through various ways of dealing with issues like those depicted via desktop exercises, hypothetical review, and remedial training. There were several missed indicators of potential threats, complacent behavior by staff, and justifications used by members of the security team that could have prevented or mitigated the scenario’s result.

Right off the bat, during briefing, the lieutenant related that they had received an anonymous tip that a convicted murderer was going to be harmed by someone during a hearing scheduled for today. While this information heightened awareness of the security team, the Lieutenant nor any of his supervisory team reacted to this threat by adjusting staff levels, tightening security protocols, or by setting up secondary screening areas where member could funnel those worthy of a more detailed screening. The lieutenant should have taken this opportunity to provide briefing training on what to do in case of emergency, metal detector functions, and advised everyone to be on a heightened sense of security for the day. He/she should have also alerted the entire court staff of the threat and provided a flow-chart or contact list of who to contact and what to do should something/someone cause them concern.

Because most perpetrators prepare for their attacks, often with extensive planning and sophistication (Jones, 2003), even the slightest deviation from normal screening practices by security staff might be just enough for an attacker to halt his/her plan. The suspect may see the secondary screening area and opt for a different location, or an easier way to put the plan in motion, out of fear of getting sent to secondary and his weapons discovered.

In the scenario, a man is seen standing outside the doors of the courthouse acting nervously. Before this man even walked inside the building, an opportunity to ‘ped-check’ or simply strike up a consensual conversion with him was missed. It was at this point that the man, later id’ed as Mr. Midas, was struggling with an incredible amount of internal turmoil while deciding if he should go ahead with his plans or abort them. There is a possibility that he may have left the area after seeing deputies walking toward him. Had he stayed and engaged them in conversation, deputies may have found his weapon(s) following a pat-down search or they could have found inconsistencies in his story for being there that may have prompted further investigation.

For our sake here, we will assume that did not happen and Mr. Midas made it into the facility and the metal detectors. Another clue staff missed was Mr. Midas’ attempts to shift the focus away from the sounding alarms to his apparent misfortune and injuries after falling off his scooter. What he was doing was redirecting attention away from his concealed weapon with a grand story. All staff needed to do was slow everything down and further investigate what was causing the machine to activate. Understanding that the metal detector had not been serviced in some time, staff in this case fell victim to complacency and did not follow a tell-tale sign that something was wrong. On a side note, the Lieutenant should have ensured that vital safety equipment, such as the metal detector(s), are serviced and in good working order. While budget cuts are common, there are many avenues available to find funding for minor issues like this.

Moving forward, after Mr. Midas was allowed to continue into the courtroom, there is no evidence that staff prepared for this hearing by adjusting time schedules, seating arrangements, or even that other court staff members were made aware of the received threat to the defendant’s safety. If the court staff had been made aware, the court report would likely have keyed into the fact that Mr. Midas was asking where the defendant would be located during the hearing. He/she could have given that information to the bailiff who, armed with the threat information from briefing, could have investigated Mr. Midas as well.

Court design is an issue in this case because staff members, to include law enforcement and the judge, enter the room in the same fashion as the public. Special access to and from courtrooms should be afforded staff, law enforcement, and defendants to avoid contact with the general public (Griebel & Phillips, 2001). The bailiff in this case does not have a radio or other emergency communication devices. Because the Lieutenant did not properly staff this hearing, additional law enforcement nor security personnel are present absent the single bailiff. Once Mr. Midas takes him/her out, the poor design of the courtroom leads to further disaster & injury. Previous training, lacking in this scenario, would have prepped staff for ways to deal with lockdowns, safe havens, or other emergency responses for situations such as this. As a result, no one knows what to do and further injury should be expected.

In this scenario, many if not all of the issues highlighted in this case could have been mitigated through training, policy, and professionalism. Because of complacency, poor design, lack of policy, and poor training (at best), this scenario predictively turned toward a worst-case scenario and it could have all been avoided.

References

Michael Griebel, & Todd S. Phillips. (2001). Architectural Design for Security in Courthouse Facilities. The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science. Retrieved from: http://eds.a.ebscohost.com.libraryresources.columbiasouthern.edu/eds/detail/detail?http://eds.a.ebscohost.com.libraryresources.columbiasouthern.edu/eds/detail/detail?

Jones, T. L. (2003). Court security: a guide for post 9-11 environments. Springfield, IL: C.C.

Thomas.

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