Boston Marathon Bombing

Boston Marathon Bombing


Boston Marathon Bombing

Part 1

According to Cordner, G.W. (2019), police have a central role in the defense of homeland security and the four elements of the police position in the homeland security department consists of the security system, the criminal justice system, the safety system, and the national system. The safety system involves fire-fighters services, emergency medical workers, and public health services like hospital. The criminal justice system stops offense from occurring, acts whenever a crime is committed, and prosecutes criminal suspects. The security system is basically private security and private enforcement, which are like law enforcement officers stationed in hospitals, schools, shopping malls, and local businesses in downtown districts where protection is requested or required. The national security system came about after the events of September 11, 2011. Officers have been identified as an essential part of the anti-terrorism operation, functioning in partnership with the police, intelligence agencies and those in the national defense or security system (Cordner, G.W. 2019).

When the Boston Marathon attack, or bombing, took place in 2013, all four of these elements was utilized. The first services that was provided was that of the safety system. Firefighters arrived on the scene to provide security, while ambulance crew members and urgent care- centers all handled the victims who were affected by the bomb attacks. The criminal justice system came into place when law enforcement officers arrived on the scene and began to search for the perpetrators and assist those within the safety system treat the victims who were injured. The national security network was provided when the local law enforcement officers collaborated alongside state and federal agents to resolve the horrible crime (Kettl, D 2013). The security system was provided when law enforcement officers provided the protection portion, ensuring the safety of the civilians, and advising people to remain inside their residence until the perpetrators had been apprehended.

This was one of the most horrific terrorist attacks that occurred within the United States. The attack on the twin towers on September 11, 2001, demonstrated how terrible the communication was between the different law enforcement organizations. That’s why it is crucial for all organizations within the safety system, security system, criminal justice system, and the national security system have open communication amongst one another to be able to collaborate and try to prevent tragedies like 9/11 and the Boston Marathon bombing from happening again.

It has been observed that effective response depends on good ties between people who have learned to work together before events occur (Kettl, D. 2013). The city’s network of ambulances, police, and hospitals replied immaculately, most because they had been preparing for such a day over the years. All four components, even citizens who hadn’t been injured, operated very well together as a unit. The final scenario occurred from Friday, April 18, 2013, to Saturday, April 19, 2013, when the deadly car chase began, and lockdown came about the whole Boston area. Boston’s national patriotism came through as Dzhokhar Tsarnaev, who’s older brother and fellow suspect, Tamerian Tsarnaev, died following a shootout with law enforcement, was taken into custody after a hail of gunfire involving a secured boat in a backyard (Wojtys, E. 2013). On 8 April 2015, a jury found Dzhokhar Tsarnaev guilty of all 30 counts against him ( Editors, 2014-2019). The terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001, has really helped homeland security, as well as local law enforcement organizations to reevaluate the safety and security networks and make some changes to protect the citizens and try to prevent future attacks.

Part 2

Intelligence-led policing is a relational approach that starts with knowledge, collected at all levels of the enterprise, being evaluated to generate useful intelligence and a better understanding of the operational environment (Cordner, G.W. 2019). The key components of this phase for analysts include the development of tactical, organizational, and strategic intelligence resources that meet immediate needs, faster situational awareness and provide the framework for long-term planning (Cordner, G.W. 2019). Intelligence-led policing accesses the data on violence to illustrate, or explain, and help to determine ways to revamp the neighborhoods that are considered to be the most dangerous.

A fundamental concept to community policing is that people should have such incentives in a free society to form their societies’ style and manner of policing. An additional benefit of such public involvement is generally a rise in mutual trust and credence (Cordner, G.W. 2019). More than the others, the community policing paradigm insists on giving residents a greater role in security and police governance. Community policing aims to lower the rates of crime and violence by analyzing the features of social issues and then implementing issue-solving solutions. In order for law enforcement officers to effectively be fortunate enough to perform the duties of community policing, the neighborhood in which the law enforcement officer is assigned, should be limited and minuscule. When it comes to community policing, this is why it is extremely important for law enforcement officers and the residents residing within those neighborhoods to create a desperately desired amount of trust because it requires both, law enforcement officers and residents, to work alongside, or together.

Due to past incidents that occurred between law enforcement officers and citizens that resulted in law enforcement officers using excessive force, and in some cases even deadly forces, has really drove a wedge between law enforcement officers and the people in the communities. The media doesn’t make the situation any better with their reports because in most cases they cut out half of the story. The types and duration of media exposure can influence the views of criminal justice authorities, along with individual demographic factors (Levan, K. & Stevenson, K. 2019). The only way it may become possible for law enforcement officers to try to reduce crime rates within the communities is if they try to become more involved with the community to show citizens that not all police officers are bad. Every agency or organization have their bad apples, but they’re more good officers than bad. Until the community can learn how to rebuild that trust with police officers, the crime rates are going to continue to sky rocket and neighborhoods are going to continue to become more dangerous.

I live in Houston, Texas, and we have a very high crime rate here. According to the Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI) crime data report (2018), “In 2018, there were 43,637 violent crime incidents, and 49,008 offenses reported in Texas by 260 law enforcement agencies that submitted incident-based (NIBRS) data”. Houston is the fourth most populous city in the United States, therefore, with all the different cultures, race and ethnicity, and religious groups, the crime rate is extremely high. If I had to guess, I would say it’s because of drugs and gang violence because it’s so diverse. The Houston Police Department is always short staffed leaving officers to have to cover larger areas which could seem impossible and very frustrating.


Federal Bureau of Investigations. Crime Data Explorer. (2019). (NIBRS). Incident-based details reported in Texas. Retrieved from

Cordner, G. W. Police Administration. [Purdue University Global Bookshelf]. Retrieved from Editors. 28 March 2014- 7 June 2019. Boston Marathon Bombing. Retrieved from

Kettl, D. Boston Marathon Bombing Highlights Homeland Security Done Right. June 2013.

June (2013). Retrieved from

Levan K and Stevenson K (2019) ‘There’s gonna be bad apples’: Police–community relations through the lens of media exposure among university students. International Journal for Crime, Justice and Social Democracy 8(2): 83-105. DOI: 10.5204/ijcjsd.v8i2.1039. Retrieved from file:///Users/shirletharichard/Downloads/1039-Article%20Text-4104-1-10-20190501.pdf

 Wojtys E. M. (2013). The Boston marathon tragedy. Sports health5(4), 305. Retrieved from