PAD 520 Week 7 Discussion 2 Monitoring Through Experimentation

Monitoring Through Experimentation


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Monitoring Through Experimentation

In the job market, competition among employees is beneficial to employers because they incentivize workers and promote innovation. However, workers should only engage in healthy competition that leads to their optimum performance instead of engaging in competition that negatively affect their overall output. For weaker employees to succeed in their jobs, they need to be motivated in a way that makes they view stronger workers as their peers rather than their superiors.

Through tie-breaking rules, it is possible to identify the factors that will favor students so that they become successful in their jobs. In this context, students are the weaker workers because they did not graduate high school. Favoring weaker employees through beneficial tie-breaking rules levels the playing field thereby decreasing discouragement effect. Strengthening weaker employees through tie-breaks reduces discouragement effect, strengthens overall competition and encourages all the workers.

Employees competing have different levels of education; different employees possess different types of certificates. This makes competition uneven. Difference in education level among employees working together negatively affect their performance because they feel unequal. This is known as discouragement effect: employees with the lowest level of education do not perform optimally when they face their colleagues with highest level of education. This discouragement effect has been proved through experimental research (Dechenaux et al., 2015).

Use of tie-breaks is both economically important and statistically important. Weaker employees are significantly strengthened by increasing their average bargaining power. Stronger employees also react methodically to modifications of tie breaking rules. In conclusion, tie-breaks increase the potential of weaker employees to perform better.


Dechenaux, E. K. (2015). A Survey of Experimental Research on contests, all-pay auctions and tournaments. Experimental Economics, 18, 609-669.